On September 2, 2017, President Trump said he planned to begin the process of withdrawing from the agreement in the near future. Trump has said he is consulting with his top advisers, some supporting the withdrawal and some — including Gary Cohn, President Trump`s chief economic adviser — no. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed the withdrawal from the agreement.  Until October 4, 2017, the Trump administration had withdrawn from the Korus Free Trade Agreement and agreed with South Korea to renegotiate the agreement.  President Trump and his Korean counterpart Moon Jae-in first spoke of a renegotiation of korus at the June 2017 Korea-US summit. Soon after, Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. Trade Representative, requested a special meeting of the KORUS Joint Committee.8 The special session took place in August, but could not find a solution. At that time, press reports indicated that Trump might withdraw from the agreement.9 However, following a new meeting in October, the two sides agreed to begin the process of amending the agreement.10 Overall, the KORUS RENEGOTIATION is a minor change in U.S.-Korea trade relations and not the global revolution, who represent Trump and his trade advisers. This is surely the best thing to do. However, concern about KORUS was less strong for the Trump administration than other trade relations in which the US might take more aggressive action. The escalation of the trade conflict between the United States and China, the continued application of various unilateral tariffs by the government and the blocking of appointments to the highest court of the World Trade Organization are at the center of the debates. Addressing these burning issues will further show whether the government can find a way to put in place a coherent trade strategy that will not resolve decades of trade liberalization.
== Exports of agricultural goods to Korea declined by 5.4% in the first five years of the Korean Free Trade Agreement, although nearly two-thirds of the value of U.S. agricultural exports benefited from immediate duty-free entry into Korea under the pact. Meanwhile, U.S. agricultural imports from Korea increased by 45.4% under the free trade agreement. As a result, since the implementation of the free trade agreement, the U.S. trade balance with Korea has fallen by 8.1 percent, or $554 million. The renegotiation of KORUS is a useful example of Trump`s trade deals in practice. As we`ll see below, the renegotiation made only minor changes to the deal and could be understood in such a way that the reality of Trump`s trade policy may not always match the rhetoric. However, the government`s concerns about trade with Korea have always been less acute than their concerns about trade with other trading partners, so the conclusion of the KORUS talks, with minor modifications, may simply reflect the government`s focus on other areas of trade policy and not an indication of its general approach to trade policy. trade policy. As in the United States, the free trade agreement in Korea is proving to be a very divisive issue.
Opposition arguments tend to focus on perceived differences in the agreement and public opinion. Proponents tend to focus on economic predictions. As an alternative to presenting the Certificate of Origin, a free-form certification can be used by Korean manufacturers and exporters as well as U.S. importers if it is confirmed that their products meet the requirements of the Korean Free Trade Agreement. . . .